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DE RUEHFR #0410/01 0791607
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P 201607Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5819
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0758
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6311
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T PARIS 000410 

NOFORN 
SIPDIS 

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CHARGE D’AFFAIRES MARK PEKALA 

EO 12958 DECL: 03/20/2019 
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, MOPS, NATO, FR, AF, RU 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT’S BILATERAL MEETING 
WITH PRESIDENT SARKOZY ON THE MARGINS OF THE NATO SUMMIT

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Mark Pekala for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ).

¶1. (S/NF) Key points:
-- Your visit comes at a historic time. Nicolas Sarkozy is the most pro-American French President since World War II and is, at the moment, arguably the most influential leader in Europe. Sarkozy,s goodwill and your prestige give us an unprecedented opportunity to cement the positive changes he has already made and to strengthen the relationship for years to come.
-- Sarkozy is unquestionably the driving force in all of French foreign and domestic policy. A pragmatist and an activist, he can be brilliant, impatient, undiplomatic, hard to predict, charming, innovative, and summit-prone. He strongly believes that it takes political leaders to slice through the &Gordian knots8 that bureaucracies can often be unable to resolve. He has no qualms about jettisoning policies that, from his perspective, have outlived their usefulness.
-- Your personal rapport with Sarkozy will be a factor in the overall relationship, and he is eager for a genuine friendship in addition to a working relationship. He was disappointed not to have been the first EU leader invited to Washington.
-- Expect Sarkozy to pitch big ideas on everything from the financial crisis to the Middle East peace process. In turn, he will respond well to your bold, inventive proposals.
-- Sarkozy should get a clear sense of your priorities and, as appropriate, red lines. Sarkozy wants to get off on the right foot with you and will respect your goals.
End key points.

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EARLY FOREIGN POLICY GOALS: RETURN TO EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP AND THE ALLIANCE WITH THE U.S.
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¶2. (C/NF) Since the beginning of his Presidency in 2007, Sarkozy has targeted his foreign policy efforts on re-establishing France,s image as a leader in Europe (and the world), following the debacle of France,s “no” vote on the EU constitution in 2005. Through personal intervention, often at the cost of ruffling the feathers of his German and British rivals, he sought to make the EU a more dynamic and active world player. His personal intervention and leadership during the Georgia crisis, the economic crisis, and the Gaza fighting won grudging acceptance and even approval from European leaders who, even though offended by his brash dominance of the limelight, recognized that he was making the EU an effective player. He pursued a similar campaign to return to the heart of NATO and the Atlantic alliance. He focused French and European attention on strengthening the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), taking advantage of crises in Africa and off the Somali coast to cobble together effective responses with a European imprimatur. At the same time, he stage-managed a year-long review of France,s security posture for the 21st century, which will re-allocate resources across the French military and use money saved to modernize its equipment. These efforts culminated in a forced political march toward a domestic debate and a (successful) Parliamentary vote, not only on France,s full reintegration into NATO but on the totality of Sarkozy,s foreign policy.

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MOVING FORWARD IN AFGHANISTAN
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¶3. (C/NF) With France,s full return to NATO assured, Sarkozy will want to want to show that France and Europe have a more effective voice in decisions, particularly on Afghanistan (where French leadership can galvanize other allies to do more). Sarkozy is a strong supporter of the allied action in Afghanistan, but there is little popular support for the policy or public understanding of the threat.  Sarkozy,s recent appointment of Pierre Lellouche to mirror
the role of SRAP Holbrooke is a positive signal that France will be engaged and active; at Sarkozy,s behest, Lellouche is seeking to organize a gendarme training unit in Afghanistan, in advance of the NATO Summit. But France is constrained by issues of operational tempo and the financial crisis, as well as by concerns about the strategy, goals, and time-line for success in Afghanistan.

¶4. (S/NF) Sarkozy, who plans to visit Afghanistan and Pakistan in May, will likely delay any announcement of increased commitment, civilian or military, until after that trip. Ironically, announcement of increased U.S. force participation has lifted some of the urgency from our allies, including France. Your discussion will be important to help Sarkozy demonstrate to his public that the U.S. is consulting with him before acting and that there is a new strategy that will be better coordinated and more effective. Addressing the summer Afghan election plans -- and pledging better coordination among allies in theater, while pressing for a stronger civilian commitment -- will be key to securing increased French participation. French officials view Pakistan as intrinsically linked with the challenges and issues in Afghanistan. However, France is a relative newcomer to Pakistan and relies heavily on the U.S. and United Kingdom for information and analysis. France has proposed regular trilateral consultations with France, the UK, and the U.S. to better coordinate our policies in the region.

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SEEKING A GREATER ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
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¶5. (S/NF) Sarkozy shares most of our strategic objectives in the Middle East, from achieving Israeli-Palestinian peace to preserving Lebanon,s independence and sovereignty to dissuading Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. When he differs with us on tactics, he is not -- as was sometimes the case with previous French leaders -- being difficult simply for the sake of appearing distinct from the U.S. To the contrary, Sarkozy,s approach is fueled by pragmatism; to get results, he has abandoned policies that, from his perspective, have outlived their usefulness and launched others (e.g., engaging Syria) that have sometimes put him out in front of Washington. He views our own effort at talking to Damascus with a certain sense of vindication and would respond well if you were to ask his assessment of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. Be prepared to hear that the glass is half-full. Although Sarkozy feels stung by Asad,s failure to send an ambassador to Beirut as promised, he and his advisors have opted to downplay this failure and remain convinced that engaging Syria has paid dividends. As for Lebanon, Sarkozy hosted Lebanese President Sleiman in Paris March 16-18 for a state visit timed to bolster Sleiman in advance of Lebanon,s parliamentary election. Whatever the election outcome, France wants to see another unity government in Beirut -- not out of love for Hizballah and its allies, but to avoid subjecting Lebanon to additional fighting that Hizballah would almost certainly win and which could also spark a more serious regional crisis.

¶6. (S/NF) By the same token, Sarkozy sees no credible alternative to Palestinian reconciliation. He agrees with the ideals expressed in the Quartet Principles, but assesses that the status quo hurts Fatah and the Palestinian Authority more than Hamas. He would welcome any initiative to repackage the Quartet Principles -- indeed, he allowed FM Kouchner to propose that the EU take a less dogmatic approach on engaging Hamas -- in a way that allows the international community to work with the next Palestinian government. Sarkozy respects Special Enjoy Mitchell but may tell you, as he told Secretary Clinton, that Mitchell is &too wise.8 Sarkozy favors bold steps and has not abandoned his idea of convening a Middle East peace summit. Though he understands that the timing is not optimal, you can expect him to press for action. He is also keen to take up President Asad,s offer that the U.S. and France co-sponsor a resumption of Syrian-Israeli negotiations. On Iran, Sarkozy is the toughest of the EU leaders, yet he harbors no illusions about the likelihood of further UNSC movement at the moment; he will likely suggest that you postpone engaging Tehran until after Iran’s upcoming presidential election.

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RUSSIA - DIALOGUE, NOT ISOLATION
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¶7. (C) Sarkozy came to power determined to do away with the personal diplomacy of previous French presidents and to take a hard look at French interests in the relationship with Russia. However, during the Georgia crisis that erupted at the start of the French EU presidency, he fell back again on his penchant for personal engagement and testing the word of his counterparts. While wary of Russian intentions in Georgia, Sarkozy has made clear his belief that Georgia and other areas of disagreement with Russia are best handled through diplomatic engagement and not through isolation. He has thus pushed for talks on a partnership accord between Russia and the EU to proceed (they are currently on a very slow track) as an inducement for better Russian behavior. Sarkozy has also sought to engage and cultivate Russian President Medvedev, over Prime Minister Putin, in the apparent hope of strengthening relative moderates in Moscow.

¶8. (C/NF) Like other French officials, Sarkozy is looking for some indication of where we want to take U.S.-Russian relations and how we concretely intend to “reset” the relationship. While Sarkozy surprised aides and allies by responding positively to Medvedev,s initiative to renegotiate Europe,s security architecture, his gambit that this should take place inside the OSCE (where the focus will be on Russian behavior and not the structure of the western alliances) seems to have won some traction. Sarkozy may warn of the political consequences, including in foreign policy terms, of a steady deterioration of socio-economic conditions in Russia caused by the financial crisis. He might also couple any advocacy of sustained engagement with Moscow with criticism of the feckless and divided leaderships, as he sees them, in Georgia and Ukraine.

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AND BEYOND
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¶9. (C/NF) Sarkozy is trying to activate French policy and influence elsewhere but with less success. In Latin America, he sees Brazil,s Lula as a key partner with a shared interest in helping transform Cuba. His Asia policy is a shambles. The Chinese are still seething that Sarkozy vacillated about attending the Olympics last August and met with the Dalai Lama in Gdansk in December. The Japanese have told us they feel neglected, particularly compared with the attention lavished by Sarkozy,s predecessor. And Sarkozy,s determination to turn around French Africa policy is still a work in progress )- but one where we and France can continue to cooperate closely. Sarkozy will also be interested in your onward travel to Turkey, where bilateral relations have long been soured by France’s and Sarkozy,s opposition to full EU membership.

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ECONOMIC ISSUES
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¶10. (C/NF) President Sarkozy sees the current crisis as vindication of the French model of state interventionism in the economy. Although domestically he has set in motion reforms designed to open the economy to more market-friendly forces, his Gaullist instincts, never dormant, have been on prominent display during the crisis. In the run-up to the G20 London Summit, he and his government have used the United States as public foil to rally support for tighter global regulation of the economy. He boasted repeatedly of having “imposed” the initial G20 meeting in November on Washington and generally has downplayed U.S.-supported work on crisis-related issues in the Financial Stability Forum and elsewhere.

¶11. (C/NF) With EU partners, he has had mixed success in pushing for a more robust state role in defending industry, a case he often makes by invoking vague arguments that “the Americans do it, so we should, too.” He gets more traction in Europe from his government’s support for regulating trade based on &societal8 preferences (against U.S. agriculture for example) or a priniciple of European preference. You will have had the chance to discuss economic issues in
London, but a reminder to President Sarkozy that our economic relationship is central to our broader partnership would be timely.

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DOMESTICALLY
------------ 

¶12. (C) Sarkozy dominates the French political landscape. As in foreign policy, he is the driving force. He charged into office in 2007 pledging to reform everything from labor laws to the university system. But the sharp economic downturn has slowed many of these ambitious initiatives, and Sarkozy,s approval ratings languish between 40 and 45 percent, never having recovered from an early wave of bad publicity about his personal foibles. His energetic, occasionally impulsive leadership style has been a lightning rod for criticism, as has his propensity to rely on a relatively small group of advisors. Nonetheless, Sarkozy remains fully in command of the politics, policy, and direction of France; he will continue to do so at least until the 2012 presidential election.
¶13. (U) Mr. President, everyone at Embassy Paris (and, indeed, all of France) looks forward with great excitement and profound pride to welcoming you to Strasbourg next month.
PEKALA