Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 1295 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F H I J K L M N O P R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
QA
YM YI YE

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09CARACAS728, VENEZUELA INCAPABLE OF SUBSTANTIVE NUCLEAR

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09CARACAS728.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09CARACAS728 2009-06-11 17:05 2010-12-09 14:02 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Caracas
VZCZCXRO6727
PP RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG
RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHCV #0728/01 1621724
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111724Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3176
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY
RUEAHLC/DHS WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
Thursday, 11 June 2009, 17:24
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000728 
SIPDIS 
HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
COMMERCE FOR 4332/MAC/WH/JLAO 
TREASURY FOR RJARPE 
NSC FOR RKING 
EO 12958 DECL: 04/21/2019 
TAGS ECON, PGOV, PREL, ETRD, EINV, ENRG, TRGY, EMIN, PTER, 
PINR, ASEC, MOPS, PARM, VE 
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA INCAPABLE OF SUBSTANTIVE NUCLEAR 
COOPERATION WITH IRAN/RUSSIA
REF: A. CARACAS 26  B. LA PAZ 806
Classified By: Economic Counselor Darnall Steuart for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: A plain-spoken nuclear physicist told Econoff that those spreading rumors that Venezuela is helping third countries (i.e. Iran) develop atomic bombs “are full of (expletive).” He said Venezuela is currently unable to provide such assistance particularly as the Chavez administration “does not trust scientists.” He added that Venezuela’s nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia finalized May 4 is pure political theater as Venezuela is incapable of cooperation with Russia on the development, design, construction and operation of nuclear reactors. Also contrary to the agreement with the Russians, to the knowledge of the scientific community, there is no exploration or exploitation of uranium, ongoing or planned, in Venezuela. The scientist contended that, even if the Venezuelan government used all Cuban scientists, exploring for commercially viable uranium deposits in Venezuela would require a large taskforce and news of such an effort would leak quickly. END SUMMARY.
------------------------------------------- 
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT POLITICAL THEATER
------------------------------------------- 
2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told Econoff June 3 that the agreement between Venezuela and Russia on nuclear cooperation has no real substance. The agreement, signed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in November 2008, but approved and formally issued by Venezuela’s National Assembly May 4, lays out cooperation between the Venezuelan Ministry of Energy and Petroleum and Russia’s Rosatom in the following areas: 1. Basic Nuclear Research; 2. Controlled Thermonuclear Synthesis; 3. Development, design, construction and operation of nuclear reactors; 4. Industrial production of inputs and components for nuclear reactors; 5. Exploration and exploitation of uranium and thorium; 6. Infrastructure development for nuclear energy; and 7. the development of a legal framework in the sector.
3. (C) In a previous conversation XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the only part of the Russian agreement that had any potential might be the exploration and exploitation of thorium, as he believes Venezuela has significant deposits of that resource (Ref A).  XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized that as to the rest of the agreement, meaningful cooperation is not possible. All Venezuela is currently capable of, he argued, is the purchase of finished materials and technology.
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
URANIUM EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION NOT HAPPENING
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX bluntly discounted the idea of cooperation with the Russians on uranium exploration and exploitation, as well as rumors that Venezuela is providing Venezuelan uranium to assist other countries (i.e. Iran) with “atomic bombs.” (Note: International press reports citing an Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry document leaked May 25 alleged that Bolivia and Venezuela are supplying uranium to Iran. For a similar perspective from La Paz on the dubiousness of this claim, see Ref B.) XXXXXXXXXXXX added that former Venezuelan President of the Inter-American Commission on Atomic Energy Julio Cesar Pineda’s May 8 statements to the press about Venezuela having more than 50,000 tons of uranium were “funny” and “not too clever.”
5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that in the states of Merida and Trujillo, there might be uranium deposits ranging between 60 parts per million (ppm) and 2,000 ppm, with 200 ppm being the minimum for an economically viable deposit. He contended that no one could be sure, however, since the last meaningful study
CARACAS 00000728 002 OF 002
concluded in 1976. He noted that XXXXXXXXXXXX has conducted a “yellow cake” experiment with a few milligrams of Venezuelan uranium, but that it is impossible to extrapolate or even guess at the amount of uranium in Venezuela from such limited testing.
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that currently, as with all nuclear related materials, if Venezuela had a need for refined uranium, it would make much more economic sense to simply buy it rather than try to produce it itself. For political reasons, however, the government could decide to refine uranium anyway, XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested. He claimed that no Venezuelan scientists would be involved in such a decision as the Chavez administration “does not trust scientists.” Nevertheless, he added, there is no indication of any interest on the part of the government to resume uranium exploration or exploitation.
7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the last uranium exploration effort involved multiple labs and more than 30 scientists. Such a major undertaking would not be easy to hide for long, he said, even if the government avoided using Venezuelan scientists and opted instead for a 100 percent foreign team consisting primarily of Cuban members. Additionally, there are only three labs in Venezuela that could measure whether or not uranium concentrations are high enough to exploit. All three labs, including the one at USB, XXXXXXXXXXXX reluctantly admitted, either have broken equipment or no nitrogen. None of the three, he said, could currently participate in such a study.
------- 
COMMENT
------- 
8. (C) Although rumors that Venezuela is providing Iran with Venezuelan produced uranium may help burnish the government’s revolutionary credentials, there seems to be little basis in reality to the claims. Similar to the conclusions drawn by La Paz in Ref B, it is highly unlikely that Venezuela is providing Venezuelan uranium to third countries. At one point, Venezuela may have been able to make good on Chavez’s claims that it would purchase multi-billion dollar nuclear power plants from the Russians, but even that type of “nuclear cooperation” is doubtful due to the Venezuelan government’s current financial difficulties.
CAULFIELD