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Viewing cable 09BRUSSELS1032, IN A REPEAT OF 2008, DIVISIONS EXIST BETWEEN EU
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BRUSSELS1032 | 2009-07-28 14:02 | 2010-12-03 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | USEU Brussels |
VZCZCXRO8346
RR RUEHAG RUEHDH RUEHHM RUEHPB RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHTM RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBS #1032/01 2091445
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281445Z JUL 09
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEU/EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001032
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2019
TAGS: ECON EIND ENRG EUN EWWT KGHG SENV TPHY TRGY
TSPL
SUBJECT: IN A REPEAT OF 2008, DIVISIONS EXIST BETWEEN EU
MEMBER STATES ON CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter Chase, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. As it prepares for Copenhagen, the EU is
reliving many of the arguments that plagued it during
negotiations of the Climate and Energy Package last year. At
a recent EU Energy and Environment Ministers meeting, Poland
is leading what appears to be the same group of Central and
Eastern European Member States in opposing the concept that
they should pay for reducing carbon emissions in developing
countries with much larger GDPs, notably China. Despite
indications that internal questions had been settled, the
economic recession is exacerbating the divisions among Member
States. Additionally, in working toward the EU,s emissions
reduction target, now 20% from 1990 levels in 2020 but with
the possibility of going to 30% with "comparable" efforts
from other developed countries, the EU has painted itself
into a corner, both potentially forcing it to make
increasingly painful reductions and making it next to
impossible for the EU to commit to anything more than 30%.
It will use its offer to go to 30% as a negotiating tactic so
it can justify its actions to its citizens and its companies.
End summary.
¶2. (C) During negotiations in 2008 on the EU,s Climate and
Energy Package, Poland formed a coalition with eight other
new Member States to gain concessions during the final
drafting to account for emissions reductions during the 1990s
and the possible threats to economic growth. Now, in
debating how the EU will approach the UN climate change
negotiations, Europe is seeing a repeat of the 2008
divisions. A Finnish delegate indicated to USEU EconOff on
the margins of the July 23-25 informal Energy and Climate
Ministers meeting in Are, Sweden that the EU,s effort is
suffering from a repeat of last year, and several Member
States are very upset that the actions of some are "holding
the EU hostage." Germany is concerned that a lack of
internal solidarity is leading to problems with the EU,s
position and leadership internationally. A German delegate
stated that Poland,s argument thus far can be summed up to
"give us two billion euros for technology."
¶3. (C) The main issue is that some Member States have a
problem with the increased burden placed upon them in
addition to that of the Climate and Energy Package. A Polish
delegate argued that the new Member States are at a
disadvantage and to catch up with the rest of the EU, they
will need to move faster than anyone globally, simply under
the terms of the Climate and Energy Package. A Latvian
delegate explained that even in Latvia, with its high
proportion of renewable energy and its effort to move
farther, it is not a wealthy country and should not be asked
to pay for China and India. As a result, during the internal
discussion on how to share the burden of EU mitigation and
financing efforts, a Slovakian official explained that the
coalition formed during the Climate and Energy Package is
forming an alternative position to the major Western European
Member States. According to the Polish delegate, this will
allow a real discussion as to how to address historical
responsibility, in which early efforts by the new Member
States--beyond post-Soviet deindustrialization--can be taken
into account. This will also allow Poland and others to
defend their use of coal, expected to be for the long-term
and not accepted by many in the EU, on energy security
grounds.
¶4. (C) Beyond the formation of the opposition bloc, few other
decisions have been made, most notably on the move from 20%
to 30%. Swedish Environment Minister Andreas Carlgren,
supported by Environment Commissioner Stavros Dimas, publicly
stated in re that there is "broad agreement" in the EU to
push towards an ambitious Copenhagen agreement that allows
for the EU to move to 30%. However, internally, there are
divisions, including how to define comparability. A
Slovakian delegate argued that 20% is still the current
formal position, and divisions remain as to if and how to
move to 30% and under what conditions. A French delegate was
more subtle and explained that moving from 20% to 30% is not
a fundamental problem, but the EU will not make the decision
until Copenhagen. By contrast, a Norwegian delegate
explained that the EU has positioned itself politically based
on the "inevitable" move to 30%, that it would be impossible
to avoid its commitment to 30%. The EU will thus use 30% as
a negotiating tactic to move others to stronger commitments,
so that it can justify its own decision to move to 30% to its
citizens and companies, who are arguing that the EU should
not go farther until other developed countries follow.
(Note: Norway, while not a member of the EU, is a part of the
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), and is thus privy to internal
discussions. End note.)
BRUSSELS 00001032 002 OF 002
¶5. (C) The EU has made few other decisions related to
financing. Poland and Latvia, among others, continue to
argue that the GDP per capita of many Member States is less
than that of China, and thus they should not be asked to pay.
However, Western European Member States are more concerned
at the moment as to how to develop a framework for financing.
A German delegate explained that Germany would like the EU
to be more concrete on a financing framework, but should not
present a concrete number until much later. According to the
delegate, this framework should be based on efforts by
developing countries, a sentiment echoed by Carlgren when
during a press conference, he repeated the EU mantra of "no
money, no deal," adding to it "no actions, no money."
¶5. (C) Comment. Unsurprisingly, the EU remains undecided,
and in some cases, divided, as to how it will approach the
final months of the UN negotiations. The Swedish Presidency
claims these issues will be worked out by the end of October,
when Finance and Environment Ministers meet back to back in
Brussels on October 20-21, followed by the European Coucil
of Heads of State on October 29-30. It i likely that
Poland, using its bloc of EasternMember States, will
continue to press for conessions internally, much as it did
during negotiations last year. While it is not yet clear how
these internal debates will play out, it is likely some
concessions will be made so the EU can present a unified
position in the international negotiations. The EU is so
concerned that it maintain its leadership position, it will
likely work rapidly to address the concerns of these Member
States, although doing so will either raise the pain for the
Western EU members or dilute the EU,s claim to lead
internationally. End comment.
CHASE
.