Currently released so far... 1295 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/10
2010/12/09
2010/12/08
2010/12/07
2010/12/06
2010/12/05
2010/12/04
2010/12/03
2010/12/02
2010/12/01
2010/11/30
2010/11/29
2010/11/28
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Paris
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy Sanaa
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tallinn
Browse by tag
CH
CA
CD
CV
COUNTER
CO
CY
CDG
CU
CE
CASC
CJAN
CS
CACM
CDB
CM
CLINTON
CIA
CMGT
COUNTERTERRORISM
CI
CVIS
CG
CF
CN
EPET
EINV
ENRG
ECON
EFIN
ETTC
EU
EAID
EN
ELAB
EG
EAGR
EWWT
EIND
ETRD
ES
ECUN
EUN
EMIN
EAIR
ET
EINDETRD
EUC
ELTN
EC
ECPS
ER
EZ
ECIP
ENVR
EFIS
EXTERNAL
EI
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EINT
EREL
KNNP
KPAL
KS
KNPP
KTFN
KISL
KGHG
KSCA
KV
KDEM
KSPR
KU
KPAO
KJUS
KCOR
KCRM
KACT
KBIO
KN
KAWK
KIPR
KHLS
KIRF
KGIC
KRAD
KMDR
KAWC
KPWR
KG
KFIN
KOLY
KWBG
KSUM
KPIN
KTIP
KDRG
KCOM
KTIA
KPKO
KE
KZ
KDEMAF
KWMN
KR
KSEC
KDEV
KHIV
KCIP
KIFR
KGCC
KPRP
KUNR
KNUC
KFRD
KMCA
KWAC
KCFE
MO
MY
MCAP
MARR
MASS
MIL
MOPS
ML
MR
MNUC
MA
MTCRE
MEPP
MAR
MAPP
MU
MD
MZ
MX
MOPPS
MASC
MG
MK
MTCR
MPOS
MCC
MP
PREL
PINS
PINR
PTER
PGOV
PHUM
PL
PARM
POL
PBTS
PHSA
PK
PM
PSOE
PREF
PAK
PE
PROP
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PSI
PA
PINT
PO
PGOF
POLITICS
PECON
PEPR
PBIO
POGOV
PINL
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09MOSCOW2354, MEDVEDEV'S CALL FOR REFORM: ANYONE LISTENING?
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MOSCOW2354.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09MOSCOW2354 | 2009-09-14 15:03 | 2010-12-01 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXRO5097
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #2354/01 2571501
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141501Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4797
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002354
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR ECON EFIN RS
SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV'S CALL FOR REFORM: ANYONE LISTENING?
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle; reasons 1.4(b/d).
¶1. (C) Summary: President Medvedev's article "Russia
Forward," released on the Internet with little fanfare
September 10, launched a vociferous debate among politicians
and analysts about the feasibility and probability of the
kinds of reforms needed to implement his vision for a more
diverse economy, healthier population and engaged citizenry.
It also launched the fall political season, fueling
speculation of divisions within the tandem and jockeying for
position before 2012 elections. The article is not so much a
break with the Putin past, as an attempt to moderate its
excesses. Regardless of who wrote it, Medvedev has now
linked his political fortunes to realizing its vision. End
Summary.
¶2. (C) In a lengthy essay entitled "Russia Forward," first
released mid-day September 10 on the liberal Gazeta.ru
Internet website, and later posted to the Kremlin's website,
President Medvedev described a litany of ills that plague
Russia: reliance on the export of raw materials as the
primary source of national income; the decrepit state of
infrastructure; the cancer of corruption; and the weaknesses
of civil society and the institutions meant to channel
citizen participation in government. It is a bluntly
pessimistic assessment, combined with a vague call to action
and an appeal to the public to support him in combating these
ills and to rally, as they did in World War II, to defeat
these new enemies that threaten their country's and
children's future. Medvedev focuses on the imperatives of
modernization, of economic diversification and of the
involvement of an active, engaged citizenry, in fighting
corruption. He is unusually pointed in identifying an
"ensconced group of corrupt officials and do-nothing
entrepreneurs" as the chief source of these problems. The
article presents no solutions to the maladies outlined.
Medvedev is fact eschews the more liberal path of the 1990's,
repeating oft-used complaints against the "liberals" who
brought political chaos and economic and financial
destitution to Russia by the end of that decade.
Reactions - Call for Action? Plea for Sympathy?
--------------------------------------------- --
¶3. (C) Medvedev succeeded, if in doing nothing else, in
giving political commentators ample material for policy - and
political analysis. His manifesto answered the call of many
elites who had been demanding a strong declaration of
presidential views on the present situation. Others are
connecting this article with his previous declarations,
noting that, as in the past, the rhetoric comes without any
concrete proposals for resolving these issues.
¶4. (C) Speculation began immediately as to the author of the
text. Some credit Medvedev with writing much of the article
himself, noting that it elaborates on themes he has been
publicly stressing during his presidency - his famous (if
dormant) four "I's," the fight against corruption, poor
infrastructure (roads, health care, etc.), demographic
problems and the need for citizen participation. Some have
focused on this exposition as a not-so-veiled critique of the
Putin years - building on Medvedev's earlier comments after
the dam disaster about the country lagging technologically.
However, others see in the text the hand of Vladislav Surkov,
Kremlin architect of Russia's "sovereign" democracy. Most of
the article's main themes - Russia's backwardness, the
do-nothing entrepreneurs, high-tech as an economic salvation
- were previewed by Surkov in a July 28 discussion with
Ambassador. The appeal for greater public involvement in the
managed, strictly-defined institutions created by Surkov
could only have been promoted by the "Grey Cardinal" himself.
¶5. (C) For the most part reaction among leading political
commentators - on editorial pages of major newspapers, on the
radio talk show circuit and on the plethora of
politically-oriented blogs - has been politely welcoming of
Medvedev's intentions, but critical of the clear disconnect
between his stated ideals, and the very different reality
which he plays a role in sustaining. XXXXXXXXXXXX
described Medvedev's perspective as a "Soviet way of looking
at things;" the reality, and what those in power paint as the
reality, do not correspond. XXXXXXXXXXXX argued
that it was hypocritical of Medvedev to talk about political
competition when in Moscow opposition parties are denied
the right to participate in elections. He belittled the calls for
political engagement by citizens in the current Putin-made
MOSCOW 00002354 002 OF 003
system - of which Medvedev is a direct beneficiary - a system
that has in fact dismantled pluralism and restricted
political involvement.
¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized that the article is a trial
balloon for Medvedev's annual address to the nation (poslanie),
planned for late October or early November. It was reported weeks
ago that Medvedev and a team of consultants had already begun
work on a draft during summer holidays in Sochi. While his
2008 poslanie centered on political reform, his 2009 address
is said to focus on economic reforms. XXXXXXXXXXXX
charged that the article - perhaps one basis for the poslanie - is an
appeal for ideas, but not a clear call to liberals trumpeting
their goals and aspirations. Rather, it charts a middle
course, and will be used by both liberals and conservatives
for their own purposes. It is a political document, intended
not to advance the goals he speaks of, but to bolster his
position among both camps. XXXXXXXXXXXX criticized the
article for not having outlined solutions and for its sharp
rejection of any constructive lessons that could be gleaned
from the so-called liberal ways of the 1990's and be applied to
address Russia's problems of today.
Medvedev in 2012? Tandem Tensions?
----------------------------------
¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX has warmed to giving him the benefit
of the doubt in recent months, told us that he appreciated the
sentiments that motivated the article, but was frustrated
that there was no plan outlined for action. XXXXXXXXXXXX
argued that the kind of development envisioned by Medvedev
is hindered by an alliance between business and government
bureaucracy - business pays off the bureaucracy and bureaucracy
defends business from real competition. Until that bond is broken,
real economic reform based on innovation will be impossible.
Medvedev's indictment of the judicial system was also on
target, he told us, but would require a long-term commitment
to fighting entrenched interests if it is to be reformed.
¶8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX called the article's ideas "Putin 2.0,"
modifications to the general principles that have guided Russia
over the past decade, but not a rejection of them. Combined
with Putin once again publicly toying with the idea of running
for president in 2012, Medvedev's article revives speculation
that the two leaders do not see eye-to-eye on major issues,
and that should Medvedev not build momentum for the
changes he espouses, Putin may step forward to present a status
quo platform more to the liking of the oligarchs and possibly
more appealing to average citizens. While the Internet is
abuzz with commentary on the article, state-run television
has accorded it minimal coverage, focusing more on Putin's
annual performance before the Valdai Group.
¶9. (C) Kremlin-sanctioned opposition political parties (KPRF,
LDPR, Just Russia and Right Cause) issued mildly supportive
statements about the President's appeal for national
dialogue, though KPRF Deputy Chairman Melnikov argued that
the call will fall on deaf ears given that "the state has
worked hard to switch off the peoples' minds in recent
years." Yabloko leadership issued a scathing rebuke, calling
the article nothing but empty words when judged against
Medvedev's ineffectiveness in defending basic freedoms and
democracy during his presidency.
Where to from Here?
-------------------
¶10. (C) While the initial disappointment over the absence of
concrete proposals may be understandable, Medvedev himself
cautioned that change would be evolutionary, not
revolutionary. Taken with the results of a recent Levada
poll that shows regional leaders more disposed toward Putin,
Medvedev may be taking a slow approach, connecting with his
"base" - urbanites, better-educated elites and the
Internet-connected middle class - seeking their support for
processes which will have benefits not for them, but for
their children. Having responded to the growing uneasiness
among his "base" that he had not yet used his "bully pulpit"
enough to put forward an agenda to correct the political
deterioration and economically-myopic policies of the Putin
years (fixated on the export of raw materials), Medvedev has
sparked a national debate - at least among those with access
MOSCOW 00002354 003 OF 003
to the Internet (33 percent of Russians). Given that Putin's
support is the main source of Medvedev's hold on power, it is
hard to imagine that the article could have been released
without general agreement with its content by Putin himself.
Whoever wrote the actual article, it is a first-person
Medvedev document, and his political credibility depends on
follow-through -- with citizens, in his poslanie and in
taking on entrenched bureaucratic and business interests.
Beyrle