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RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 000302 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2020 
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC MASS IR TU
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' FEBRUARY 18 MEETINGS WITH U/S 
SINIRLIOGLU 
 
REF: ANKARA 263 
 
Classified By: AMB James F. Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  During February 18 "Shared Vision and 
Structured Dialogue" meetings in Ankara,   Turkish MFA 
Undersecretary Sinirlioglu: 
 
-- Appealed for "simultaneity" between Armenian Protocols 
ratification and the Minsk Process; 
-- Registered increasing GoT dissatisfaction with Iraqi PM 
Malaki; 
-- Expressed hope USF-I CG Odierno's engagement would elicit 
substantive cooperation from the KRG against the terrorist 
PKK; 
-- Urged higher profile USG involvment in the Cyprus 
reunification talks, and; 
-- Confirmed GoT interest in further dialogue on missile 
defense. 
 
End Summary. 
 
IRAN 
---- 
 
¶2. (C) Burns strongly urged Sinirlioglu to support action to 
convince the Iranian government it is on the wrong course. 
Sinirliolgu reaffirmed the GoT's opposition to a nuclear 
Iran; however, he registered fear about the collateral impact 
military action might have on Turkey and contended sanctions 
would unite Iranians behind the regime and harm the 
opposition.  Burns acknowledged Turkey's exposure to the 
economic effects of sanctions as a neighbor to Iran, but 
reminded Sinirlioglu Turkish interests would suffer if Israel 
were to act militarily to forestall Iran's acquisition of 
nuclear weapons or if Egypt and Saudi Arabia were to seek 
nuclear arsenals of their own.  He said the international 
community's patience with Iran had been met with the Iranian 
refusal, since October, to work with the P5-plus-1, the 
clandestine enrichment facility near Qom and Tehran's recent 
decison to enrich its low-enriched uranium to 20%.  The 
IAEA's creative proposal to fabricate new fuel assemblies for 
the Tehran Research Reactor had stumbled on a technically 
unfeasible Iranian counter-offer for a simultaneous exchange 
in Iran of Iranian fuel for fuel assemblies.  Carefully 
constructed sanctions, Burns argued, targeting the 
increasingly pervasive economic power of the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, would convey the international 
community's unity and determination.  "We'll keep the door 
open to engagement," he stressed.  A visibly disheartened 
Sinirlioglu conceded a unified message is important.  He 
acknowledged the countries of the region perceive Iran as a 
growing threat:  "Alarm bells are ringing even in Damascus." 
 
ARMENIA 
------- 
 
¶3. (C) Sinirlioglu appealed for "simultaneity" between 
Armenian Protocols ratification and the Minsk Process.  He 
emphasized "a strong reaction" against the protocols among 
ruling party MPs had to be overcome before the government 
would hazard a ratification effort.  He warned Congressional 
passage of an Armenian genocide resolution would "complicate" 
his government's domestic political calculations regarding 
ratification.  He said if something acceptable to Azerbaijani 
President Aliyev can found, then "we can move" the protocols 
forward.  Sinirlioglu suggested Azerbaijan and Armenia's 
announcement of an agreed framework for Minsk Group progress 
would provide the GoT with the necessary political cover. 
Burns inquired about the prospect for progress on a natural 
gas deal between Turkey and Azerbaijan.  Sinirlioglu implied 
 
ANKARA 00000302  002 OF 005 
 
 
Aliyev is holding an agreement hostage to Turkey's handling 
of the protocols:  "He doesn't trust us." 
 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
¶4. (C) Sinirlioglu registered the GoT's increasing 
dissatisfaction with PM Malaki and fear that he is tending 
"to get out of control."  "He is preoccupied with his 
political survival;" nevertheless, Sinirlioglu continued, 
the GoT is in frequent contact with him.  The MFA hosted 
Maliki advisors Sadiq al Rikabi and Tariq al Najmi to 
meetings 10 days prior.  Sinirlioglu lamented Iran's efforts 
to influence the election.  He noted Saudi Arabia is also 
"throwing around money" among the political parties in Iraq 
because it is unwilling to accept the inevitability of Shia 
dominance there.  "We want a free, transparent and fair 
election," he said, "we need to forestall a deepening of the 
sectarian divide." 
 
¶5. (C) After the March 7 elections, Sinirlioglu said, Turkey 
would initiate an effort to connect Iraqi gas fields to the 
Turkish grid via a 300 kilometer pipeline, costing USD 500 
million.  He asserted the pipeline could begin pumping within 
two years.  He alleged Iranian opposition to the pipeline 
because most of Iraq's gas fields are in Kurdish and Sunni 
areas.  Sinirlioglu advocated a second pipeline that would 
give Iraqi oil an alternative to the Gulf as a route to 
Europe once the country is able to meet its OPEC quota.  He 
asserted the piplines' construction would pull the several 
Iraqi communities together into a common project.  The 
creation of new "common assets," he said, could be more 
important for its politically unifying effect than its 
economic impact. 
 
¶6. (C) Sinirlioglu registered his appreciation for USF-I 
Commanding General Odierno's recent visit.  He hoped for the 
early drafting of an action plan that would elicit more 
cooperation from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) 
against the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) 
leadership harboring in northern Iraq:  "We want the KRG to 
understand that working with us is important." 
 
ISRAEL 
------ 
 
¶7. (C) Burns focused on Turkey's strained relationship with 
Israel.  Sinirlioglu argued "the problem is not bilateral, 
but general."  He attributed increasing regional country 
frustration with Israel to the stalled Peace Process, 
especially on the Palestinian track.  He blamed the lack of 
progress on Israeli intransigence, which caused regional 
stake-holders to question Netanyahu's goals.  He contended 
the "humanitarian situation in Gaza," which is not a 
punishment of Hamas, but of the Gazan people, fed Turkish 
popular anger against Israel.  Even so, bilateral cooperation 
with Israel is continuing.  Turkey is acquiring Israeli 
military equipment, notably Heron UAVs.  Direct flights 
between the two countries are routine.  Two-way trade is 
healthy, he said, tourism has dropped recently, but "will 
recover."  Sinirlioglu described Israeli Defense Minister 
Ehud Barak's mid-January visit as "very good."  He noted the 
MFA is exploring the possibility of arranging a meeting 
between the two prime ministers on the margins of an 
international gathering.  Returning to a GoT obsession, he 
recalled the Turkey-brokered Syria-Israel proximity talks, 
"which were shattered by Cast Lead," Israel's December 2008 
military operation in Gaza.  Burns noted Syria places high 
value on Turkey's role as a mediator and repeated Senator 
Mitchell's statement that Turkey-brokered proximity talks can 
make an important contribution to the Peace Process. 
 
ANKARA 00000302  003 OF 005 
 
 
 
SYRIA 
----- 
 
¶8. (C) Sinirlioglu contended Turkey's diplomatic efforts are 
beginning to pull Syria out of Iran's orbit.  He said a 
shared hatred for Saddam had been the original impetus for 
their unlikely alliance.  "Now, their interests are 
diverging."  Once again pitching Israel-Syria proximity 
talks, Sinirlioglu contended Israel's acceptance of Turkey as 
a mediator could break Syria free of Tehran's influence and 
further isolate Iran. 
 
EU, CYPRUS and GREECE 
--------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Sinirlioglu said Turkey's EU accession is being 
obstructed by the politically motivated objections of several 
member states, notably France, Austria and Cyprus.  He 
reserved special criticism for President Sarkozy.  He accused 
France of changing the rules mid-game.  He contended French 
opposition to Turkey's membership is "deepening the cultural 
divide" between Christian Europe and the Muslim world:  "A 
wider audience is watching this." 
 
¶10. (C) He regretted perceived Greek Cypriot complacency 
regarding the island's reunification talks:  EU "membership 
makes them invulnerable."  Greek Cypriots, he said, want the 
world to forget the progress achieved by the Annan Plan in 
¶2004.  They pretend relations between the island's two 
communities are an internal affair, even though, by treaty, 
it's been an international issue for 50 years.  Talat's 
cross-voting proposal, Sinirlioglu continued, should have 
been a breakthrough, but the Greek Cypriots failed to react. 
Downer is frustrated, Sinirlioglu alleged, and so are the 
Turkish Cypriots.  He implied the island's Turkish community 
would register its frustration by voting out Talat as TRNC 
"president" in April.  He renewed Turkey's appeal for higher 
profile direct USG involvement in the negotiations. 
 
¶11. (C) Sinirlioglu welcomed Greek PM Papandeou's belated 
response to Erdogan's October 30 letter seeking a frank new 
discussion of the two neighbors' several long-running 
disputes.  He conceded Papandreou's delay is understandable 
in light of his likely preoccupation with Greece's acute 
financial crisis.  Based on Papandreou's response, 
Sinirlioglu said, Turkey expects to begin new talks with 
Greece soon. 
 
AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN and INDIA 
------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Burns opened the discussion on Afghanistan with 
praise for Turkey's military, training and development 
contributions there.  Sinirlioglu said Turkey had chosen to 
focus on three Afghan challenges:  "the marriage of Wahhabism 
and Pashtun nationalism"; the chronic antagonism between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and; the country's security forces 
deficit.  He said Turkey plans to address the first by 
ramping up its education programs in Afghanistan; the second 
by pursuing its trilateral Ankara Process, which sponsors 
meetings of senior Afghan and Pakistani ministerial and 
intelligence counterparts, and; the third by establishing a 
police training center in Kabul that aims for a throughput of 
5160 trainees per year.  Keying off the last point, AMB Tacan 
Ildem, who recently concluded an assignment as Turkey's NATO 
PERMREP, declared the EUPOL police training effort in 
Afghanistan a failure.  He said the EU's  criticism of 
Turkey's unwillingness to work directly with EUPOL is 
unjustified.  He argued, since Turkey does not have a 
security agreement with the EU and is excluded from the 
 
ANKARA 00000302  004 OF 005 
 
 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the GoT lacks a 
legal basis on which to cooperate with EUPOL.  "We would like 
the EU to involve us not as a third country, but, in view of 
our accumulated rights," as a candidate for membership.  He 
urged the USG not to coordinate bilateral agreements to 
support EU operations but, instead, to route all cooperation 
with the EU on security issues through NATO. 
 
¶13. (C) Deputy Undersecretary for South Asian Affairs Engin 
Soysal led the discussion on Pakistan.  He described the 
Ankara Process and the recent Turkey-sponsored Afghanistan 
Neighbors Summit as Turkish efforts to assert regional 
responsibility for South Asia's inter-linked problems.  He 
said Turkey had not invited India to the neighbors summit in 
deference to Pakistani sensitivities; however, he claimed, 
Pakistan understands attempting to exclude India from the 
nascent South Asian regional structures would be a mistake. 
He reported Indian Prime Minister Singh had requested 
President Gul's assistance with Pakistan during the latter's 
visit to New Delhi the previous week.  Acting on that 
request, Gul had phoned Pakistani President Zardari, who was 
skeptical of Indian intentions.  Gul is planning to visit 
Pakistan later this year.  Soysal said Iran is proposing a 
quadrilateal summit, which would include Turkey, Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, but that proposal had yet to generate 
enthusiasm. 
 
¶14. (C) Soysal, Turkey's former ambassador to Pakistan, said 
the Pakistani military, though displeased with Zardari, 
remains unwilling to intervene; nevertheless, senior 
officers' patience may not be infinite.  Zardari needs to 
increase the democratic legitimacy of parliament.  Soysal 
offered.  Nawaz Sharif has become a much more constructive 
player. 
 
¶15. (C) Soysal urged a NATO training role in Pakistan. 
Picking up from Soysal, Tacan Ildem suggested NATO invite 
Pakistani military officers to courses at Oberammergau. 
 
BOSNIA 
------ 
 
¶16. (C) Sinirlioglu registered the GoT's determination to 
resist perceived EU efforts to exclude Turkey from the 
Balkans, particularly Bosnia.  He identified effecting 
rapprochement between Bosnia and Serbia as Turkey's immediate 
diplomatic goal for the region.  Towards that end, 
Sinirlioglu said, we convinced Haris Siladjdzic, who had been 
in Ankara the day before, to cease references to Serbian 
"genocide."    The United States and Turkey have "agreed to 
disagree" on the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Bosnia; 
nevertheless, "we value your involvement in the Balkans." 
 
BILATERAL EUROPEAN RELATIONS, NATO 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) Burns inquired about Turkey's bilateral relations 
with Europe.  Sinirlioglu briefly recapped Turkey's 
unhappiness with Sarkozy.  He described his country's 
relationship with Austria as infected by the latter's ethnic 
prejudice.  He complained Belgium and Denmark are reluctant 
to suppress terrorist PKK-affiliated organizations active in 
their countries.  Tacan Ildem added that, as part of the 2009 
POTUS-brokered deal that had overcome Turkish objections to 
the appointment of Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO Secretary 
General, Denmark had promised to clarify its legal 
requirements prerequiste to acceding to Turkey's request for 
the closure of Roj TV, a PKK mouthpiece.  This still needed 
to be done, Ildem said. 
 
¶18. (C) Picking up from Ildem, Sinirlioglu recalled the 
 
ANKARA 00000302  005 OF 005 
 
 
POTUS-brokered deal had included an understanding that a 
qualified Turk would be considered for Assistant Secretary 
General.  Instead, he said, a German of uncompelling merit 
was selected.  "We suspect a deal between Rasmussen and 
Merkel."  Ildem complained high-level positions should be 
part of NATO reform:  "We missed an opportunity with the 
selection of the Assistant Secretary General."  Sinirlioglu 
added:  "We let Rasmussen have Secretary General, because we 
trusted you." 
 
MISSILE DEFENSE 
--------------- 
 
¶19. (C) Sinirlioglu inquired about Russia's reaction on 
missile defense.  Burns said the Russians are much more 
relaxed towards the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) and we 
hope to have more conversations on missile defense 
bilaterally and, eventually, within the NATO-Russia Council. 
Sinirlioglu recalled PM Erdogan's request in his recent 
meeting with SECDEF Gates that the Iranian threat not be 
highlighted to justify PAA. 
 
¶20. (U) Participants: 
 
Turkey 
 
Undersecretary Feridun Sinirliolgu 
Deputy Undersecretary Engin Soysal 
Ambassador Reha Keskintepe, Director General for the Americas 
Ambassador Tacan Ildem, Director General for International 
Security Affairs 
Ambassador Aydin Sezgin, Director General for Intelligence 
and Security Affairs 
Ebru Barat Gokdenizler, Deputy Director General for the 
Americas 
Serhat Aksen, Department Head, Americas 
 
United States 
 
Undersecretary William Burns 
Ambassador James Jeffrey 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Tina Kaidanow 
Bridget Brink, NSC 
Daniel O'Grady, Political Counselor 
Tamir Waser, P Staff 
Jeremiah Howard, Deputy Political Counselor - Notetaker 
 
¶21. (U) Undersecretary Burns has cleared this cable. 
 
 
 
Jeffrey 
 
"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"